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Psychopharmacology has fueled war and sustained soldiers in combat in remark-
able ways. Although drug addiction among soldiers returning home from wars has 
been limited to a minimum of cases, sensationalized myths of large numbers of 
drug- addicted veterans who might present a threat to society upon their return 
have been disseminated in some notable instances. These myths have been used in 
efforts to enact both anti- drug regulations that apply to the military and anti- drug 
laws that apply to society.
Throughout the centuries, psychoactive substances have been used in war for two 
general purposes. First, drugs have been “prescribed” to soldiers by military author-
ities for improving fighting effectiveness. Stimulants (such as amphetamines and 
cocaine) have been issued by troops, prior to battle or during fighting, to enhance 
combat performance. These drugs— by improving stamina, empowering the body, 
increasing alertness, and boosting fighting spirit— have been significant force 
multipliers. Sedatives, such as alcohol, marijuana, and opiates, have been adminis-
tered after the actual fighting to cure or prevent the effects of war from damaging 
soldiers’ psyches. Because combat trauma might make soldiers less fit for future 
fighting, downers helped calm their shattered nerves. Second, drugs have been self- 
prescribed by combatants. Men- at- arms have always taken various intoxicants rec-
reationally, both stimulants and depressants. Although not officially approved, such 
unauthorized self- medication was often accepted so long as it did not affect combat 
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and troop morale.
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The following examples illustrate how battlefield intoxicants have been both 
perennial and universal. In Greek civilization, opium was commonplace. In the 
Odyssey, Homer describes how grief over the loss of companions in the Trojan 
War was alleviated by nepenthe, or the “drink of oblivion”— a mixture of wine 
and opium.1 The warriors of the Siberian tribes of Chukchi, Kamchadals, Khanty, 
Koryaks, and Yakuts traditionally used Amanita muscaria, a mushroom also known 
as “fly agaric,” which has both hallucinogenic and stimulating effects. Legends say 
that the people who consumed the fungus were fierce and brutal “mushroom war-
riors.” The use of Amanita muscaria in combat was not, however, limited to Siberia. 
During the war between Sweden and Norway in 1814, some Swedish soldiers got 
high on it and fought in “a raging madness, foaming at the mouth.”2 From about 
the 1620s, the Rajputs, members of a Hindu warrior class, were regular opium eat-
ers. Moderate use of opium in India was assumed to be essential for good com-
bat.3 Conversely, in nineteenth- century China, the uncontrolled consumption of 
opium led to the deterioration of the armed forces. Approximately 70 percent of 
soldiers there were addicts. Thus the Chinese Army was unable to defend the coun-
try against the flow of opium in the Opium Wars of 1839– 1842 and 1856– 1860. To 
take another example, during the Anglo- Zulu War of 1879, the British were aston-
ished by the bravery and fearlessness of the enemy. But traditional bellicosity apart, 
the Zulus had been fortified with herbal stimulants, mainly dagga, a South African 
variety of Cannabis.4 West African peoples, in turn, consumed mildly stimulating 
cola nuts, which contain caffeine and theobromine. Or take the case of the Andean 
tribes who chewed coca leaves, a mild stimulant that enhanced their combat per-
formance. World War I brought cocaine, derived from coca leaves, to the frontline. 
Soldiers were not only issued the drug to enhance their performance but also took 
it recreationally to calm their nerves. Inevitably, the war left hundreds of thousands 
of veterans addicted to cocaine.
The drug of choice during World War II was amphetamines.5 The German blitz-
krieg was significantly fueled by a methamphetamine “attack pill” called Pervitin. 
From 1939 to 1945, the Wehrmacht soldiers were issued 200  million meth pills. 
Great Britain, the United States, and Japan followed suit by providing amphet-
amines to their troops. It is estimated that British soldiers consumed 72  million 
Benzedrine tablets and that American troops used between 250  million and 
500 million Benzedrine pills during the war. The Japanese Army regularly admin-
istered methamphetamine to its soldiers for the purpose of “boosting fighting 
spirit.” During the Korean War (1950– 1953), the administration of dextroamphet-
amine (Dexedrine) to American troops became commonplace. Servicemen were 
also given amphetamine injections and had access to methamphetamine. Soldiers 
self- prescribed intoxicants, too. After soldiers discovered that heroin increases the 
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effects of amphetamine, they began injecting a mixture of the two drugs known as 
speedballs, though today the term is used to describe the mix of heroin and cocaine.6
What the majority of the aforementioned examples illustrate is that most of the 
effects of psychoactive substances, especially stimulants, have been highly desired 
for increasing military effectiveness. These substances have helped provide what 
every military organization has tried to achieve through training, in that stimulants 
enhanced performance, reduced stress, eliminated hunger, fueled courage, induced 
numbness, and boosted morale. Most important, many intoxicants and their cock-
tails produced the majority of these effects all at once. Because these drugs enable 
better training and better fighting, combatants have eagerly used them.
However, as history reveals, the military use of drugs has often led to substance 
dependency. And at times, politicians, mass media, and anti- drug activists have con-
structed an intimidating image of addicted returning soldiers as ferocious “others” 
who would spread narcotic epidemics and threaten the social order. This atmosphere 
of fear sometimes led to the rise of moral panics, which were often used instrumen-
tally by policymakers in their efforts to enact national anti- narcotic measures.
Throughout American history, substance dependence and its associated dangers 
have been traditionally linked to the category of the stranger: a foreigner, an immi-
grant, or a member of an ethnic minority group. Drugs have been connected with 
a specific other. Thus a fear of opium smoking in the United States has been associ-
ated with Chinese immigrants. A fear of cocaine, which was used in the South by 
black workers who commonly used the drug to help themselves perform hard work 
in ports, at construction sites, and so forth, has been associated with black workers. 
A fear of marijuana brought by immigrants from Mexico has been associated with 
Mexican immigrants. In sum, American attitudes toward illegal drugs and the dis-
course on the threats the drugs pose to traditional white society have been shaped 
largely through the prism of the stranger.7
This chapter looks at one of the cases of “othering” through the creation of a 
moral panic over the issue of drugs: American soldiers who served in the Vietnam 
War were stigmatized as strangers for being excessive drug users. In the early 1970s, 
heroin was closely associated with a new type of other— a returning Vietnam soldier 
who was a junkie. The fear of addicted veterans was used by the Nixon administra-
tion to help justify launching a war on drugs in 1971. The construct of a junkie vet-
eran, embodied as an “other” who poses a considerable threat to society, had been 
used before by other governments in their drives to enforce specific drug- control 
regimes. One such example is the “cocaine panic” generated by mass media and 
politicians in Great Britain during World War I. People assumed that cocaine used 
by British soldiers had been supplied by Germany, not only to harm the combat 
effectiveness of British troops but also to undermine the British Empire. A national 
160 K A M I E Ń S K I
sense of fear led to the passing of the Defense of the Realm Act of 1916, which intro-
duced anti- narcotics regulations in the army that were later extended to the entire 
nation under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920.
T H E NA RCOT I C “CO ND I T I O N ” I N VI E T NA M
The Vietnam War (1954– 1975) is sometimes referred to as the first “pharmacologi-
cal war” because the consumption of psychoactive substances by American military 
personnel reached alarming proportions. According to the Department of Defense 
(DOD), in 1968, as many as half of American men deployed in Vietnam took some 
kind of illicit drug. In 1970, this rate increased to 60 percent; in 1973, the year of 
the US withdrawal from the war, 70 percent of soldiers there used narcotics. In 1971, 
50.9  percent smoked marijuana; 28.5  percent took hard narcotics, mostly heroin 
and opium; and 30.8  percent used psychedelic drugs.8 These disturbing statistics 
gave rise to the widespread premise that the majority of American servicemen in 
Indochina were habitual users.
Egil Krogh Jr. was President Richard Nixon’s liaison to the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs. On Krogh’s return from a fact- finding trip to Vietnam, he 
reported, “Mr. President, you don’t have a drug problem in Vietnam; you have a 
condition. Problems are things we can get right on and solve. Conditions we have 
to ameliorate as best we can. I don’t think we can solve this short of bringing every-
body home.”9 Conditions cannot be tackled and resolved like problems; rather, they 
must be managed. This chapter will examine how this narcotic “condition” came 
about, explore the measures employed to treat it, and consider the consequences of 
“bringing everybody home” with the gradual American withdrawal from Vietnam.
D RUG S P R E S CR I B E D BY T H E M I LI TA RY
The history of massive pill popping by American troops dates back to World 
War II, when soldiers might have used as many as 500 million amphetamine pills.10 
However, the regular prescription of uppers was authorized only during the Korean 
War, when the administration of dextroamphetamine became commonplace. 
Hence, to enhance soldiers’ wakefulness and performance in Vietnam, the military 
issued amphetamine stimulants, also known as speed. Elton Manzione, a member 
of a long- range reconnaissance platoon (known as a Lurp), revealed that “we had 
the best amphetamines available and they were supplied by the US government.” 
He also quoted a US Navy commando: “When I was a SEAL team member in 
Vietnam, the drugs were routinely consumed. They gave you a sense of bravado 
as well as keeping you awake.”11 Pills were usually distributed to men leaving on 
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long- range reconnaissance missions and ambushes. The opening lines of Dispatches, 
the acclaimed book by Michael Herr, a war correspondent for Esquire magazine, 
bring this out superbly: “Going out at night the medics gave you pills. Dexedrine 
breath like dead snakes kept too long in a jar.”12
Because amphetamines were issued, as one veteran put it, “like candies,” with no 
attention given to recommended dose or frequency of administration, American 
troops consumed a massive amount of speed. In 1971, a report by the House Select 
Committee on Crime revealed that from 1966 to 1969, the US armed forces used 
225  million tablets.13 Statistically, consumption averaged thirty or forty 5 mg 
Dexedrine pills per fighting man per year.14 A study revealed that 3.2 percent of sol-
diers arriving in Vietnam were heavy amphetamine users; after one year “in country,” 
this rate increased to 5.2 percent.15 Further studies revealed that 7 percent of service-
men were heavy amphetamine abusers. In summary, the administration of drugs by 
the military contributed to the spread of the amphetamine habit.
Drugs were issued not only for boosting soldiers’ performance but also to reduce 
the harmful impact of combat on their psyches. To prevent soldiers’ mental break-
downs and suffering from war traumas, the DOD employed sedatives and neurolep-
tics. For the first time in military history, the prescription of potent antipsychotic 
drugs became routine. By and large, Vietnam was “the first war in which the forces 
of modern pharmacology were directed to empower the battlefield soldier.”16
D RUG S S E LF- P R E S CR I B E D BY S O LD I E R S
What made Vietnam the first pharmacological war was not only the official 
administration of psychoactive substances but, most of all, the prevalence of self- 
medication by soldiers. The unauthorized use of drugs is often described in Vietnam 
War literature. Take, for example, Tim O’Brien’s fictional story, “The Lives of the 
Dead”: “Ted Lavender had a habit of popping four or five tranquilizers every morn-
ing. It was his way of coping, just dealing with the realities, and the drugs helped 
to ease him through the days.”17 Michael Herr reported an account of a Lurp “who 
took his pills by the fistful, downs from the left pocket of his tiger suit and ups 
from the right, one to cut the trail for him and the other to send him down it.”18 
Such pharmacological cocktails of downers and uppers both calmed the soldiers 
and sharpened their senses.
Anything that would help mitigate the consequences of being in Vietnam could 
be taken for self- medication. Table 8.1 shows the most popular self- prescribed 
drugs. Alcohol was the most common intoxicant, followed by marijuana, opium, 
heroin, amphetamines, and barbiturates. Other popular drugs used by servicemen 
included morphine (popular among medics) and hallucinogens (mostly LSD).
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Marijuana was the most common non- alcoholic drug. It was ridiculously cheap, 
as a carton of ready- made marijuana cigarettes could be purchased for five dollars 
or exchanged for a pack of American cigarettes. Marijuana was also easily available, 
as a military psychiatrist affirmed: “The drug is everywhere. All a person has to do 
to get the drug in any village hamlet or town is say the word Khan Sa.”19 In short, 
Vietnam was a paradise of psychoactive substances, with almost any intoxicant 
available at one’s fingertips.
A N T I- NA RCOT I C M E A S U R E S
At first, the army ignored the widespread use of marijuana in its ranks. In 1968, 
however, after a number of alarming media reports presented marijuana use 
as a plague that was debilitating American troops in Vietnam, action was taken. 
Educational programs were introduced in the forms of compulsory lectures, radio 
broadcasts, pamphlets, and so forth, informing troops of marijuana’s harmful and 
habit- forming effects. When these efforts proved ineffective, the army undertook 
more penitentiary actions, which were also doomed to failure. In 1969, it was esti-
mated that 30 percent of soldiers had smoked marijuana prior to their departures 
to Vietnam; after being deployed in Vietnam, 60 percent of men did so.20 A DOD- 
commissioned survey revealed that in 1971, almost 51 percent of army personnel in 
Vietnam used marijuana.21 The army’s more restrictive policy on marijuana had a 
serious unintended consequence: heroin use among soldiers quickly gained popu-
larity. It was soon realized that marijuana, which would remain the more popular 
drug of choice, was not a problem at all.
Numerous laboratories in Vietnam produced cheap and powerful heroin of 
94– 98 percent purity in a smokable form known as white snow. These laboratories 
Table 8.1. The most common drugs used by American servicemen in Vietnam*
Percentage reporting use (%)
Alcohol 92
Marijuana 69†
Opium 38
Heroin 34
Amphetamines 25
Barbiturates 23
* Based on interviews, general sample = 451.
† Estimated.
Source: Robins, The Vietnam Drug User Returns: Final Report, 29.
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flooded the country with the “white junk” to meet the rising demand of US troops.22 
The remarkable purity of this heroin, which enabled its oral ingestion instead of 
intravenous application, made it an extremely attractive drug of choice among sol-
diers. They smoked it like cigarettes, mixed it with tobacco or marijuana, inhaled 
its heated fumes, or snorted it like cocaine.23 Unlike marijuana, the use of odorless 
heroin was hard to detect without urine tests or blood samples. Some soldiers did 
not even bother to hide their habits, which were, at times, almost as common and 
ordinary as puffing cigarettes. Taking illicit drugs became so overt an activity that 
soldiers (dubbed GIs) engraved their Zippo lighters with sayings such as “Say Hi! 
If you’re high.”24
Approximately 79 percent of all soldiers who tried any narcotic in Vietnam used 
heroin.25 In the spring of 1971, military doctors estimated that 25,000 to 37,000 
soldiers, or 10 percent to 15 percent of troops in Vietnam, were addicted to heroin. 
In some units, almost 20  percent of troops were addicted to the drug. Surveys 
and studies showed that 85 percent of all American servicemen in Vietnam had 
been offered heroin; of these servicemen, 35 percent tried heroin and 19 percent 
became habitual users.26 In 1973, the DOD confirmed that about one third of 
soldiers used heroin and 20 percent became habitual users.27 In the final stages 
of the war, the use of drugs was omnipresent; on some bases the problem was so 
severe that commanders allowed prostitutes to go to soldiers’ barracks, with the 
goal of deterring soldiers from going to downtown brothels where they usually 
got supplied with dope.28
T H E M Y T H O F T H E A D D I C T E D A R M Y
The drug problem gave rise to the myth of a weak, degenerated, and addicted US 
Army in Vietnam. According to one widespread view, narcotics had made soldiers 
unfit for combat, hampered units’ fighting power, broken down military discipline, 
destroyed troops’ morale, and resulted in the collapse of the entire war effort. A 
popular myth of the “junkie army,” which was persistently reinforced by gloomy 
press reports and politicians’ public statements, implied that drugs and addiction 
were among the main reasons for the US inability to win the war.
Myriad hyperbole and false stories emerged about the use of intoxicants in 
Vietnam. Jeremy Kuzmarov traced the spuriousness of such stories and decon-
structed “the myth of the addicted army”— the army that allegedly lacked a fight-
ing spirit and combat effectiveness. The myth was propagated by John Steinbeck 
IV, the son of the famous writer, who upon his return from Vietnam, where he 
had served as a war correspondent, published an article titled “The Importance of 
Being Stoned in Vietnam” in the January 1968 issue of Washingtonian Magazine. 
164 K A M I E Ń S K I
Kuzmarov noted that “by his own admission, Steinbeck overdramatized the nature 
of drug abuse in Vietnam for political purposes,” claiming, for example, that 75 per-
cent of soldiers got high regularly.29
Other media outlets quickly struck a similar tone and helped foster the myth to 
the extent that it reached an absurd and apocalyptic peak. A headline in US News 
and World Report read “Marijuana— the Other Enemy in Vietnam.” On May 24, 
1971 Newsweek published a photo of a syringe hitting a soldier’s helmet.30 In the same 
issue Stewart Alsop claimed that “the drug epidemic” was “horrifying . . . worse even 
than My Lai.”31 The columnist presented emotional and populist arguments strik-
ingly similar to the myths peddled in Great Britain during the cocaine panic, when 
the Times of London hailed cocaine as a threat “more deadly than bullets,” not only 
to British soldiers on battlefronts but also to the British Empire.32 The cover of the 
July 5, 1971, issue of Newsweek featured an image of a civilian junkie shooting up 
heroin with the blazing headline “The Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?” The 
lead story described the spread of addiction from “the back alleys of Long Binh and 
Saigon” to “Middle- American towns and neighborhoods.”33 The authors went on 
to somehow demonstrate with exaggeration that “heroin has exploded on us like an 
atom bomb. Ten years ago, even three years ago, heroin was a loser’s drug, an aberra-
tion afflicting the blacks and long- haired minorities. Now all this has changed. Nice 
Jewish boys are coming out of the woodwork as well as Mormon kids, Japanese 
Americans and all other exemplars of hard- working middle- class ideals.”34 The sim-
ile to Americans is neither as dark nor as grotesque as a non- native English speaker 
might think. The parallel was as inappropriate as a comparison sometimes drawn 
by antiwar activists between the My Lai massacre and Nazi atrocities.35 Without 
commonsense limits, some media outlets inflated the problem of the so- called drug 
epidemic in the military so much that it was compared to medieval plagues. These 
hyperbolic analogies were accompanied by unreliable statistics equating substance 
use with abuse. Thus the category of “addict soldiers” usually encompassed those 
who merely tried drugs and never turned into habitual users. Antiwar activists used 
images of Nazi atrocities to link the United States with the perpetrators of the 
Holocaust, equating the soldiers at My Lai with storm troopers.
At the same time, some media outlets and politicians resorted to rhetoric that 
closely resembled the language of the World War I panic in Great Britain, when 
cocaine was perceived as a weapon used by the Germans to undermine the British 
war effort. Half a century later, heroin was seen as a vile weapon used by the commu-
nists to impair American forces in Vietnam. In November 1967, Walter Cronkite, 
then editor and host of the CBS Evening News, introduced a report by correspon-
dent John Laurence with this comment: “The Communists are battling American 
troops not only with fire power, but with drugs.”36
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The myth of the addicted army, as Kuzmarov points out, turned “attention away 
from the escalation of American atrocities and the ravaging of the Vietnamese coun-
tryside.”37 Long before Kuzmarov, however, Thomas Szasz, a prominent psychiatrist 
in the 1960s, disputed the myth of the addicted army and ridiculed notions that 
junkie veterans returning home posed a vital threat to public safety and national 
security. Szasz claimed that soldiers who abused drugs were being made scapegoats 
for the total fiasco of the American strategy in Vietnam and were being turned 
into national antiheroes of a “pharmacological Gulf of Tonkin.” He noted: “Like 
the Germans after World War I who claimed that their troops were stabbed in the 
back by pacifists and other ‘unpatriotic elements’ at home, we claim that our troops 
are being stabbed in the back by heroin and the pushers responsible for supplying 
it to them. As we de- escalate against the ‘Vietcong,’ we will escalate against her-
oin. No doubt we shall find it easier to control Americans who shoot heroin than 
Vietnamese who shoot Americans.”38 As Szasz saw it, Nixon’s war on drugs was a 
curveball used to distract public attention from the US strategic failure in Vietnam.
Szasz was correct: the full story of drug use in Vietnam was far different from the 
popular view. A survey commissioned by the army revealed that even soldiers who 
were addicted to heroin could conduct their normal duties. Drug use was not neces-
sarily an obstacle to fighting efficiency, and intoxication did not render troops inoper-
able.39 Michael Herr described the January– July 1968 siege of Khe Sanh, during which 
GIs voluntarily stopped smoking marijuana simply because they did not want to risk 
their lives.40 There is plenty of evidence of such self- disciplining behavior among 
troops. Soldiers usually reached for drugs when it was not too risky to get stoned; 
that is, when they were in the rear, after they had completed a mission, or when they 
were between patrols. They did not carelessly go into action intoxicated in defiance of 
their natural instincts for self- preservation. As noted social psychologist Lieutenant 
Colonel Larry H. Ingraham observed: “Soldiers are not fools. They know the dan-
gers of working around heavy equipment or going into combat unable to function. 
Individuals who threaten the lives of others are oftentimes violently excluded from 
the combat group. In Vietnam, during 1970– 71, there were performance problems 
which resulted from heroin withdrawal, but not from heroin addiction per se.”41 Less 
effective soldiering might be caused not so much by drug usage but by drug with-
drawal and its poignant psychophysical symptoms. To sum up, contrary to the myth 
of an addicted army, drug use did not seriously interfere with combat performance.
T H E O U T B R E A K O F M O R A L PA NI C
By 1970, more reports of a dramatic rise in opiate consumption by troops in 
Vietnam were reaching the American public. On May 27, 1971, two US congressmen, 
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Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, presented an influential report, “The 
World Heroin Problem,” to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of 
Representatives. In their report, it was estimated that 25,000 to 37,000 servicemen 
serving in Vietnam, or roughly 10 percent to 15 percent of the troops, were addicted 
to heroin. Although these figures approximated statistics gathered previously by 
military doctors, the public release of the figures in this report prompted a media 
frenzy and an atmosphere of moral panic.
Because this media coverage created general anxiety within US society, President 
Nixon felt obliged to make a firm response. In a special message to Congress on 
June 17, 1971, he stated that “public enemy number one in the United States is drug 
abuse” and announced measures for “a full- scale attack on the problem.”42 The pres-
ident declared a “War on Drugs.” Nixon acknowledged that “while by no means a 
major part of the American narcotics problem, an especially disheartening aspect of 
that problem involves those of our men in Vietnam who have used drugs.”43
Apart from domestic policing and treatment programs, the core measures of 
Nixon’s initial anti- drug abuse efforts were the screening of all servicemen return-
ing from Indochina, their detoxification, and adequate drug and psychological 
treatment programs. This action was thought to be essential to prevent a narcotics 
epidemic from spreading across the United States. With the Vietnamization of the 
war and the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, nearly 1,000 
soldiers were returning to the United States every day. If one were to assume that 
up to 25 percent of these soldiers were heroin addicts, this number was considered 
a serious threat to American society. Preventive measures were therefore needed. It 
was feared that veterans would commit crimes to obtain the quantities of heroin 
they needed to bring on intoxicating effects similar to those they had experienced 
in Vietnam. The heroin that was available in the United States was not only much 
more expensive than that in Indochina but also much weaker and less pure. Nixon 
warned that “a habit which costs $5 a day to maintain in Vietnam can cost $100 a 
day to maintain in the United States, and those who continue to use heroin slip into 
the twilight world of crime, bad drugs, and all too often a premature death.”44 This 
was not only a gross exaggeration but also a harmful one. The president was fright-
ening society not with a threat (a real danger) but with a risk (a probable danger). 
He presented the risk as if it were a threat. Thus the president was creating a fear of 
an addicted veteran returning home and endangering the orderly civilian world. A 
new “other” was created.
To thwart this risk, preventive actions were required to create a sort of cordon 
sanitaire (a barrier to stop the spread of disease). Nixon demanded swift action 
from Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird for the identification and detoxifica-
tion of drug- using servicemen departing from Vietnam.45 The military responded 
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promptly, and in mid- July 1971 the program, under the name Operation Golden 
Flow, was launched. The program required that all American servicemen submit 
to a compulsory urine test for the presence of heroin before leaving Vietnam. Only 
those who tested negative could return to the United States without delay. Those 
who tested positive had to undergo a compulsory five- or seven- day methadone 
detoxification. Soldiers who passed a second test were allowed to return to the 
United States, but those who tested positive twice in a row (approximately 1,000 
to 2,000 cases a month) were processed for dishonorable discharges and then sent 
back home.46 Such discharges often worsened these veterans’ drug problems, as 
only 5 percent of those who needed professional assistance were given any medi-
cal treatment. According to a report by Jerome Jaffe, the director of the newly 
established Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP), as 
many as 5.2 percent of soldiers tested positive for heroin through September 1971; 
in March 1972, the percentage of those who tested positive fell to less than 2 per-
cent.47 Overall, under Operation Golden Flow, only 4.5 percent of personnel tested 
positive. However, the urinalysis was not a credible indicator of drug abuse. The 
research carried out by Lee N. Robins of Washington University in St. Louis on 
a sample group of veterans proved that 3 percent of soldiers who tested positive 
claimed they had not taken heroin while 3 percent of those who tested negative 
admitted to using the drug.48 One method of distorting results was to get heavily 
drunk before the urinalysis; another was to submit a sample of pure urine bought 
on a “black market for clean urine” that developed among soldiers. The rationale 
behind Operation Golden Flow was less to help addicted soldiers and more to clear 
the consciences of politicians and the military and to address an imagined and exag-
gerated national emergency.
A PA I NF U L H O M ECO M I N G A ND OT H E R I N G O F VE T E R A NS
Following David Campbell’s postmodern analysis of foreign policy, the myth of the 
addicted army can be perceived in the context of the formulation and implementa-
tion of US foreign policy. In the book Writing Security, Campbell demonstrates 
how national identity is continuously constructed by the perception of threat.49 
Foreign policy becomes a grand, nonobjective discourse on the dangers posed by 
aliens or others. As the title of his book implies, security is “written,” meaning it 
is continuously constructed and created rather than grounded in objective, fixed, 
and unchangeable factors. The politicians and influence groups who shape pub-
lic opinion choose some aspects of reality and describe them as dangerous threats 
to the state and to society’s security. For Campbell, the aim of a national security 
strategy is, first and foremost, to define and uphold the identity of a state and its 
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nation. Identity is always relational— it is created by establishing borders between 
us and them (meaning an other or a stranger). The perception and interpretation of 
specific factors, groups, and phenomena, in terms of threats, help to highlight the 
hallmarks of a society and to reinforce feelings of belonging, identification, attach-
ment, and solidarity.
When American soldiers are viewed from Campbell’s perspective, they were 
returning from Vietnam and were othered by politicians and society. Because they 
were presented as excessive drug abusers, they were unjustly regarded as potential 
disturbers of the social order. Veterans were portrayed as threats to American iden-
tity as well as to society’s security. The mass media and politicians sustained this 
atmosphere of fear, with President Nixon at the forefront. The comparison of drug 
addiction to a plague, to a fatal contagious disease that develops like a cancer, that 
debilitates armed forces and then invades homes and threatens our children, was 
a useful analogy for constructing the image of the hostile other and heightened a 
sense of insecurity. The use of metaphors of poison or disease has always been a com-
mon means of differentiating between us and them. Thus the boundary was drawn 
between normal, healthy Americans and unhealthy, filthy drug users.50 A similar 
demarcation was also made between the forces of modernity and non- modernity.
Addiction is, by its nature, non- modern because it cuts an addict off from society 
and alienates him or her from the social and cultural mainstream of community 
activities.51 Addiction is a negation of modernity in that it turns users into eco-
nomically unproductive and socially dysfunctional individuals. Substance abuse 
is also non- modern because it is irrational in the sense that by providing artificial 
and inauthentic pleasures, it detaches a person from reality. Pleasures derived from 
drugs go beyond the category of delight allowed by law and society. By depriving 
addicts of free will, drug addiction undermines the essence of individual freedom, 
which is one of the pillars of American identity. While modernity frees people from 
old social, mental, economic, and customary limitations, drugs enslave people in 
a novel and toxic way. Addiction can be seen as a force that destroys the fruits of 
modernity that give people a chance and a right to better their economic status and 
make self- improvements. Addiction degrades and consumes and can turn life into 
a painful experience, all of which conflicts with the American credo that praises 
pragmatism, efficiency, productivity, in- group solidarity, and individual freedom.
Looking upon the Vietnam veteran as the other, as a potential threat to American 
identity, contributed significantly to the development of a post- Vietnam syndrome. 
The service members who had risked their lives in defense of American values and 
identity, on their return home, were considered a severe challenge to Americanness. 
Homecoming is always a momentous experience, both for the returning soldiers 
and their society. Young people who had been called to serve in a hostile land and 
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who turned to drugs to stay sane and cope with the reality of war came to be por-
trayed as fearsome addicts. They were stigmatized and victimized by politicians, 
mass media, and society.
In his book The Drugged Nation, John Finlator, a former agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, expressed a popular sentiment of the day— the fear of a narcot-
ics plague that would flood America. He issued this warning in a hysterical tone: 
“The junkman has descended on us like the Vandals upon Rome .  .  . assaulting an 
unsuspecting and unprepared people.” Soldiers returning from Vietnam were “the 
Vandals” who endangered the very spirit of America— in effect, another Rome.52 It 
was feared, as President Nixon implied in June 1971, that junkie veterans would turn 
to something like Vandal violence, exacerbating domestic crime rates and spread-
ing disorder.
Of course, the apocalyptic visions were not fulfilled. However, unlike the myth 
of addicted armed forces, the problem of drug abuse among veterans was not a fab-
rication. The drug use had been vastly exaggerated, and the image of a maladjusted, 
addicted vet persisted through the 1990s. This lingering image was largely a result of 
pop culture references, in movies in particular. For example, in Born on the Fourth 
of July (1989), the scale of addiction was depicted by showing vets doing drugs in 
the back of a veterans’ center. The US withdrawal from Vietnam did not mark the 
end of the narcotics problem because heroin arrived in the United States along with 
returning soldiers. Many people brought stashes of drugs with them; many had sent 
drugs home in advance of their returns. For example, one veteran confessed that 
a year before his date of return, he smuggled opiates in a stereo set he had sent to 
his father in the United States. Soldiers arranged special transfers of heroin from 
Vietnam, which they shared after returning home.53 The Office of Veterans Action 
in New York estimated that in 1971, between 30,000 and 45,000 heroin- addicted 
Vietnam veterans lived in the city.54
A survey of veterans who returned home in September 1971, commissioned by 
SAODAP and conducted by a team led by Lee N. Robins, revealed that the majority 
of interviewees were not habitual users of drugs. The results were startling: 43 percent 
of veterans reported the use of narcotics in Vietnam, but only 10 percent reported 
narcotics use after returning home (see table 8.2). The percentage of veterans report-
ing narcotic use since returning from Vietnam actually dropped below the percentage 
of those who reported any narcotic use before going to Vietnam. Many soldiers had 
quit by the time they left for home: 75 percent of those who had used narcotics before 
departing for Vietnam and continued to use them there quit before leaving for home, 
and 80 percent of soldiers who used drugs for the first time in Vietnam quit before 
returning home: “More than 60 percent of detected addicts stopped all narcotic use 
as they left Vietnam and did not resume it after their return to the United States.”55
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These findings were so astonishing and so severely undermined prevailing views 
on the topic that some commentators assumed that the survey results had been fab-
ricated at the request of authorities. The truth, however, is that drug use in Vietnam 
was contextual— it resulted from extreme conditions and the nature of combat. 
When the factors and conditions that led soldiers to take drugs were no longer pres-
ent, most of them gave up the habit. Another reason for a high rate of remission was 
that soldiers were averse to the intravenous application of heroin. If they wanted to 
continue “hitting the stuff,” they would have to forget about smoking heroin and 
inject it instead. Operation Golden Flow also contributed to this effect because the 
threats of a delayed return home, dishonorable discharge and court- martial seemed 
to be effective deterrent measures for some soldiers.
Commenting on this paradoxical tendency in drug use, Richard Davenport- 
Hines wrote, “The fact that US servicemen had experimented with heroin as a 
result of alcohol and marijuana prohibition, voluntarily renounced its use[,] and 
did not relapse undermined most assumptions of US drug policy.”56 It also punc-
tured the myth of the veteran as a dangerous other. An important conclusion that 
can be drawn from Robins’s findings is that there was nothing exceptionally dis-
tressing about the homecoming “junkie soldiers” that the American public should 
have to fear.
CO N CLUS I O N
Looking back, war not only favored the rise of drug consumption but at times was 
also a critical factor in the fostering of narcotic- control regulations. The othering 
of homecoming soldiers, who were depicted as dangerous junkies, was often deci-
sive for the implementation of such regulations. Scapegoating soldiers, then, served 
political purposes.
Table 8.2. Narcotic consumption by American soldiers in three time periods*
Since Return (%) In Vietnam (%) Before Vietnam (%)
Any narcotic use 10 43 11
Any heroin use 7 34 2
Narcotics use more than weekly for 
a month or more
4 27 1
Addicted to narcotics at any period 1 20 < 0.5
Urine positive for narcotics 1 10.5 — 
* General interview sample = 451.
Source: Robins et al., “How Permanent Was Vietnam Drug Addiction,” 39.
A p H A R M AC O L O G I C A L  GU L f O f TO N K I N 171
What happened to Vietnam War veterans in this regard had its analogy in 
American history. Although the massive medical use of opiates during the Civil 
War left many veterans hooked on morphine and opium, it did not lead to a social 
problem of narcotism.57 The notion of a “soldiers’ disease” or “army disease” (i.e., 
the opiates habit) exhausting veterans and their families appeared as late as the 
1910s. This modern myth was constructed and used as a means to attract public sup-
port for the 1914 Harrison Act, which put most psychoactive substances under gov-
ernment control. This legislation became the basis of US drug policy until Nixon’s 
“War on Drugs” in the 1970s. The heated debate on the “soldiers’ disease” did not 
simply overlap coincidentally with the campaign for the Harrison Act. In 1915, Yale 
University professor Jeannette Marks warned: “Did you know that there is practi-
cally no old American family of Civil War reputation which has not had its addicts? 
Did you know that it was called ‘the army disease’ because of its prevalence? Did 
you know that with the war which now hangs over us, the drug evil will spring into a 
gigantism of even more terrible growth than the present?”58 President Nixon spoke 
in a similar vein.
It was German philosopher and political theorist Carl Schmitt who introduced 
the modern meaning of the other, or stranger, as a description of the enemy. The 
enemy is someone who “intends to negate his opponent’s way of life,” so he “must 
be repulsed or fought.”59 The veterans of both the Civil War and the Vietnam War 
were presented as others, not so much in Schmitt’s understanding as a political 
enemy. They were othered, rather, in terms of an imagined challenge to the social 
order, as a threat to a peaceable way of life.
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